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IN THE SUPRElvff: COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
B 0 A R D OF EDUCATION OF 
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, a Statutory corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent_, Case No. 
vs. 9844 
REX H. COX and WILMIN A COX, 
his wife, Defendants-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This is an action by which plaintiff seeks to take 
appellant's property by way of an alleged contract, 
OR in the alternative, by way of condemnation pro-
ceedings. Said action having been filed in two separate 
causes of action, respectively. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted a default judgment on 
the first cause of action against both defendants. Both 
defendants moved the lower court to set aside the De-
fault Judgment. Defendant Rex H. Cox appeals from 
an order denying his motion to set aside the Default 
Judgment. Defendant Wilmina Cox does not join in 
this appeal as the lower court granted her motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Rex H. Cox seeks reversal of the lower 
court's order denying his motion to set aside the default 
judgment, and the right to have a trial upon the merits 
of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff caused the defendants to be served 
with a copy of its Summons and Complaint on or about 
September 10, 1962. The plaintiff pleading its case in 
two causes of action; one, requesting to take defendants' 
property by way of an alleged contract and two, by 
means of conde1nnation proceedings. The Salt Lake 
County Clerk executed a default certificate on or about 
October 2, 1962. Judge Merrill C. Faux granted de-
fault judgment against both defendants on or about 
October 5, 1962 on plaintiff's first cause of action. The 
defendants were served notice of said judgment on or 
about N oven1ber 9, 1962 and contacted counsel as soon 
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after as appointment could be made. Defendants' 
counsel immediately contacted plaintiff's counsel. N e-
gotiations were pending ·for a period of approximately 
ten days between respective counsel and their respec-
tive clients without success. Defendants filed a Motion 
to Set Aside the Judgment as well as a Motion and 
Order to Stay Proceedings and Stay Execution of 
Judgment with the lower court and plaintiff's counsel, 
on or about November 28, 1962, pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: 
1. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable 
neglect. 
2. That the judgment was based upon a void con-
tract for the reason that the same did not com-
ply with the Statute of Frauds. 
3. That the purported contract, the subject of 
said judgment, is void or voidable for failure 
of consideration. 
4. That the judgment is inequitable. 
The proceedings and execution of judgment being 
stayed as of that date until further order of the court. 
Defendants' motion was called up for hearing be-
fore the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on December 4, 
1962, all parties being present and being represented 
by counsel. At this time testimony was adduced by both 
sides and the lower court took the matter under advise-
ment and to see if the parties could not resolve their 
differences. The motion was further argued to the 
lower court by respective counsel and submitted for 
decision. 
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The lower court granted the motion to set aside 
the judgment as to Wilmina Cox but denied same as 
to Rex H. Cox. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and an Order were filed and both plaintiff and de-
fendant Rex H. Cox filed respective motions to have 
the lower court reconsider its Order and the court 
denied same. This appeal was then made on behalf 
of the defendant Rex H. Cox, and defendant Wilmina 
Cox has filed her Answer to plaintiffs' Complaint on 
file. Said case now is pending before the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S, REX H. 
COX'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DE-
FAULT JUDGMENT. 
The defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment was based upon the following grounds: 
(R. 13). 
1. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable 
neglect. 
2. That the judgment heretofore entered was 
based upon a void contract for the reason that 
same did not cmnply with the Statute of 
Frauds. 
3. That the purported contract, the subject of 
said judgment, is void or voidable for failure 
of consideration. 
4. That the judgment is inequitable. 
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Rule 55 (c) U.R.C.P. states: 
"For good cause shown the court may set aside 
an entry of default and, if a judgment by de-
fault has been entered, may likewise set it aside 
in accordance with Rule 60 (b)." 
Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. states, among other things, 
that the court, on motion and upon such terms as are 
just and in the furtherance of justice, may relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order or proceedbag. 
The statutory authority of trial courts to set aside 
judgments obtained by default has been liberally con-
strued to the end that there be trials on the merits, 
beginning with our earliest decisions. Utah Commercial 
& Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033 
(1898). 
The court will incline toward granting relief in 
doubtful cases so that the party may have a hearing. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., et al, 123 Utah 416, 422, 
260 P. 2nd 741, 744 (1953). The Utah Supreme Court 
in this case had occasion to review the policy considera-
tions and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal construction, 
thus: 
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is 
a creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may 
occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs 
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which 
prevent the presentation of a claim or defense. 
* * * Equity considers factors which may be 
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the * * * 
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hardship in granting or denying relief. Although 
an equity court no longer has complete discre-
tion in granting or denying relief, it may exer-
cise wide judicial discretion in weighing the fac-
tors of fairness and public convenience * * * ." 
The above view was also affirmed in Hurd v. Ford, 
74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908 (1929), as well as other Utah 
cases. 
Under Rule 1 (a) U.R.C.P., a defendant must be 
extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare his 
case and to meet an adversary's claims. This rule has 
been affirmed many times by our Utah Supreme Court 
and as is set forth in Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 
cited in 264 P. 2nd 880, as follows: 
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liber-
ally construed' to secure a 'just * * * determi-
nation of every action', * * * a defendant must 
be extended every reasonable opportunity to 
prepare his case and to meet an adversary's 
claims. Also he n1ust be protected against sur-
prise and be assured equal opportunity and 
facility to present and prove counter contentions, 
-else unilateral justice and injustice would re-
sult sufficient to raise serious doubts as to con-
stitutional due process guarantees." 
The situation in the instant case now before the bar 
is patently one of the very kind which the above referred 
to rules were designed to grant relief. The Honorable 
Utah Supre1ne Court has handed down several deci-
sions in the past few months directly in point. In the 
cases of E. J. MalJhrw v. Standard Gilsonite Company 
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and Beaver Dam Sales Company v. Standard Gilsonite 
Co1npany, cited in 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951, Justice 
Crockett, speaking in connection with Rule 60 (b) U.R. 
C.P., stated as follows: 
''On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice re-
lieve a party * * * from a final judgment * * * 
for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inad-
vertence_, surprise, or excusable neglect * * * . 
The motion shall be made * * * not more than 3 
months after the judgment * * * was entered 
* * * ." (Emphasis added.) 
Justice Crockett speaking further In the same case 
said: 
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court 
is endowed with considerable latitude of discre-
tion in granting or denying such motions. How-
ever, it is also true that the court cannot act 
arbitrarily in that regard, but should be gen-
erally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry 
and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled 
advisedly in conformity with law and justice. 
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably 
on a party without a hearing is obviously a harsh 
and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our 
system of justice that each party to a contro-
versy should be afforded an opportunity to pre-
sent his side of the case. For that reason it is 
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of dis-
cretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment 
where there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
application is made to set it aside." 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Chief Justice Wade in the very recent case of 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, cited in 377 P. 2d 
189, reaffirming the above views, states as follows: 
"Judgments by default are not favored by 
the courts nor are they in the interest of justice 
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or con-
stitutional right to a judgment by default with-
out a hearing on the merits. The courts, in the 
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a 
hearing on the merits of every case." 
Several other cases in which our court has affirmed 
the decisions of the above cases are: N ey v. Harrison) 
5 Utah 2d 217, 220, 209 P. 2d 1114, 1116 {1956), and 
Bylund v. Crook, 60 Utah 285, 288, 208 P. 504, 505 
{1922). 
In the case at bar the defendant had no knowledge 
of the default judgment until November 9, 1962 and 
immediately thereafter contacted counsel, who attempt-
ed to negotiate the matter with plaintiff's attorney for 
approximately 10 days. ''Then an agreement could not 
be reached, Motions to Set Aside the Judgment and to 
Stay Proceedings were filed which of course shows no 
undue delay in moving the court to set aside the judg-
ment. (R. 25). 
It is very apparent from the record that the de-
fendant misunderstood legal proceedings, that he had 
a misconception as to what a Summons was, and the 
reason for not replying to same, and as to what his 
rights were. ( R. 25, 26, 44, 46) . 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is not our purpose to quote extensively from the 
record but it is very evident from the entire record of 
the testimony of both of the defendants that there has 
been considerable misunderstanding both as to the law-
suit and an alleged contract. It is also very evident 
from the testimony of both of the defendants that there 
has been no acceptance of the purported contract, no 
meeting of the minds to say the least, that even though 
the alleged original offer recites consideration both of 
the defendants testified that no consideration was re-
ceived by them and that the alleged offer, as repre-
sented by Exhibit 1, does not now appear to be as dis-
played to them. Furthermore, said offer was withdrawn 
or rejected as is adn1itted in the record by all parties; 
therefore, said purported contract, or a subsequent one, 
which we expressly deny, must fail for failure of con-
sideration, no acceptance, and because same does not 
comply with the statute of frauds because not in writ-
ing as required. Certainly there is a big issue as to 
whether a contract does exist and one in which the 
issues should be tried. 
We invite the court's attention to the fact that this 
case is not the usual contract type of case but is one in 
which the defendant's home is being taken without due 
process of law and in a manner that will cause extreme 
hardship not only upon this defendant but on the other 
defendant (his wife) and their family. 
It is the intent of our laws to consolidate cases 
rather than separate them. To require the defendant 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to sell his joint interest in the family residence for a 
price set by the plaintiff and to require the other de-
fendant to separately litigate her interest in the same 
property certainly is not in the interest of justice and 
fair play and is in violation of our statutes. To compel 
the defendant to accept one sum of money established 
by the plaintiff for his equity in the family residence 
and the other defendant to accept an arbitrated price 
(to be set through litigation) for her equity in the same 
residence certainly is grossly inequitable and un-
just and one which will create serious tax consequences 
to all parties concerned. Furthermore, to compel the 
defendant to accept a "below market price" for his share 
in the property, as set forth in the record by both de-
fendants, without a complete opportunity for a hearing 
on the merits of the case, is grossly inequitable, against 
public policy, and to say the least, against justice and 
fair play. 
The record and the above cited cases bear out the 
fact that one or more of the reasons for setting aside a 
default judgment as set out in Rules 55 (c) and 60 (b), 
U.R.C.P., has been so thwarted that equity and good 
conscience demand that the judgment against the de-
fendant be set aside. 
The lower court was uncertain as to what to do as 
is evidenced by the statement found in the record as 
follows: "It is difficult to see where the end result 
of my ruling will be." ( R. 54) . The lower court further 
indica ted that he did not like the demeanor of the de-
fendant and we quote from the record as follows: " * * * 
his demeanor on ~he witness stand'' (R. 53) and further, 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as follows: " * * * and as to his testimony I was im-
pressed with what appeared to be a lack of veracity, 
a lack of straightforwardness." (R. 54). It is apparent 
from the foregoing that the court acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and abused its discretion in refusing to 
vacate the default judgment. The record bears out the 
fact that there was misunderstanding and confusion 
surrounding all the dealings and therefore all parties 
should have an opportunity to present their cases and 
have their day in court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in dismissing defendant's 
motion. Accordingly, it can only be concluded that the 
case at bar is one of the very kind for which Rule 55 
(c) and 60 (b) of our U.R.C.P. were designed to grant 
relief, one in which the interests of justice and fair play 
require that the motion to set aside the default judg-
ment be granted and the defendant afforded the right 
to litigate his case on the merits at the same time with 
the other defendant, his wife. 
The judgment of the lower court refusing to set 
aside the default judgment as to this defendant should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAHL AND SAGERS 
17 East Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 
Everett E. Dahl 
Victor G. Sagers 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Apellant 
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